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Abstract:  Social  interactions  regularly  lead  to  mutually  beneficial  transactions  that  are 
sometimes puzzling. The prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken and trust games prove to be less 
perplexing  than  Nash  equilibrium  predicts.  Moral  preferences  seem  to  complement  self-
oriented motivations and their relative predominance in games is found to vary according to 
the individuals, their environment, and the game. This paper examines the appropriateness of 
Berge equilibrium to study several 2×2 game situations, notably cooperative games where 
mutual  support  yields  socially  better  outcomes.  We  consider  the  Berge  behavior  rule 
complementarily to Nash: individuals play one behavior rule or another, depending on the 
game situation. We then define non-cooperative Berge equilibrium, discuss what it means to 
play in this fashion, and argue why individuals may choose to do so. Finally, we discuss the 
relationship between Nash and Berge notions and analyze the rationale of individuals playing 
in a situational perspective.  
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1. Introduction  
Although  experimental  evidence  supports  the  predictions  of  standard  economic  theory 
about the outcomes of social interactions in several competitive situations (Davis and Holt, 
1993), it usually does not corroborate the theory in cases of cooperative situations. In two-
player zero sum games, when there is a Nash equilibrium, subjects usually play according to 
that strategy (Lieberman, 1960) and even exploit the non-optimal responses of their partner in 
order to maximize their benefits (Kahan and Goehring, 2007).
1 Conversely, in mixed-motive 
game  experiments,  subjects  often  cooperate  more  than  they  should
2.  Despite  the  wide 
disparity in the experimental results and protocols on the prisoner’s dilemma (PD), meta-
analysis shows that, on average, about 50% of subjects cooperate (Colman, 1995; Ledyard, 
1995; Sally, 1995). Similar anomalies related to Nash predictions have been documented in 
studies  of  the  chicken  game  (CG),  where  cooperation  is  the  dominant  outcome  observed 
(Rapoport and Chammah, 1965), and in trust or investment games, where trust and reciprocity 
are often more significant than predicted by subgame perfect equilibrium (see e.g. Berg et al., 
1995; Bolle, 1998). 
Fischbacher  et  al.  (2001)  and  Kurzban  and  House  (2005)  observe  that  in  public  good 
experiments, not all subjects play in the same fashion. In their experiments, more than 50% 
and up to 65% of subjects contribute on condition that others do the same, less than 30% are 
pure  free  riders,  and  the  rest  adopt  a  mix  of  these  two  behaviors.  This  illustrates  the 
heterogeneity of behavior rules: individuals have types and are likely to adapt their behavior 
to their immediate environment (see also Boone et al., 1999; Brandts and Schra, 2001; Keser 
and Winden, 2000; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2005). Experiments also show that individuals may 
change behavior according to the situation of their play. For example, Zan and Hildebrandt 
(2005) found in a school experiment that children adopt different behavior rules according to 
the  type  of  game  they  are  playing,  with  cooperative  games  involving  more  reciprocal 
interactions than competitive ones.
3 Players may also adopt different behavior rules according 
to their life situations and to the society in whic h they live. Henrich  et al. (2004, 2010) for 
example,  observe  that  fairness  and  mutually  beneficial  transactions  are  more  frequent  in 
                                                 
1  Fehr and Fischbacher (2005) also review competition experiments where Nash prediction is not valid.  
2  Prisoner’s  dilemma,  chicken  games,  public  good  and  trust  games  are  the  best-documented  examples  of 
predictions of inefficient outcomes, which often are not confirmed by the empirical evidence. For surveys on the 
experimental evidence of other regarding preferences and the emergence of cooperation, see Camerer (2004), 
Fehr and Fishbacher (2005) or Fehr and Schmidt (2006). 
3 Note that there is plenty of experimental evidence of situationalism in the social psychology literature. For 
example, many examples are provided by Mischel and Shoda (1995).   3 
integrated societies. Their interpretation is that subjects conform less to Nash predictions, as if 
they were being motivated by social norms reflecting moral preferences
4. This conclusion is 
confirmed by other experimental studies such as Engelmann and Normann (2010). These 
authors have found that levels of contribution in a minimum-effort game vary across countries 
and, more interestingly, between natives, former immigrants, and new immigrants within the 
same country.    
The formal literature often considers moral preferences in games as other-regarding payoff 
transformations, a concept first mooted by Edgeworth (1893). The key to this approach is the 
assumption that a player’s utility is a twofold function, related to individual welfare and to the 
welfare of the other. Individuals are found to care about how payoffs are allocated, depending 
on the partner, the game situation, and how the allocation is made. To redefine the utility 
function in this way allows for rationalizing behaviors.
5 The Nash behavior rule is safe and 
players are supposed to choose the actions that maximize their individual redefined utility, 
given that others do the same.
6 However, to include moral preferences in the utility function 
leads us to assume that moral agents are concerned only with outcomes rather than with 
actions, which is a peculiar interpretation of moral preferences. As Vanberg (2008: 608 ) 
contends,  “moral  principles,  standards  of  fairness,  justice,[...]  are  codes  of  conduct  that 
require persons to act in fair, just, or ethical ways. They tell them not to steal, not to lie, to 
keep promises, etc. They are typically concerned not so much with what a person wants to 
achieve  but  with  how  she  seeks  to  achieve  what  she  wants”.    In  other  words,  moral 
preferences are also preferences for acting morally, following a moral rule of conduct.
7  
Our principal motivation in this paper is to examine whether complementary behavior rules 
and equilibrium may be intertwined with the Nash rule, leaving the payoff matrix unchanged. 
In line with Pruit and Kimmel (1977), we confer on individuals the capacity to adapt their 
behavior rules to the situation. In some  games, such as zero -sum situations where self -
oriented maximization is sufficient to drive action, the Nash rule would tend to be adopted. In 
others, such as games involving collective action, complementary rules embedding moral 
                                                 
4  We  intentionally  employ  the  term  moral  preferences  instead  of  other-regarding  preferences.  As  Vanberg 
(2008) claims, there is indeed a significant difference between, on the one hand, claiming that agents evaluate 
outcomes not only in terms of their own narrowly defined interests but also in terms of how they affect the 
wellbeing  of  other  persons  (other  regarding  preferences)  and,  on  the  other  hand,  claiming  that  agents  are 
motivated to act in accordance with ethical rules or principles such as fairness (moral preferences).  
5 Falk and Fischbacher (2005) propose a review of the formal models of strong reciprocity.  
6 In particular, Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Fehr and Fischbacher (2000) and Fehr and Falk (2003) argue that the 
experimental evidence for deviations from the predictions of rational choice theory can be accounted for if other-
regarding concerns are allowed to be included in individuals’ utility functions, while maintaining the assumption 
that agents are fully rational maximizers given their utility functions. 
7 Note that those norms of conduct may well be the result of an evol utionary procedure and therefore find roots 
in an outcome-based approach. We further develop this point in Section 2.2 of the paper.   4 
preferences would potentially drive the action. This situational perspective has analogies with 
the rule-following behavior approach proposed by Vanberg (2008), and is more generally 
inspired by the situational approach
8 in social psychology, according to which personality is 
construed  not  as  a  generalized  or  a  contextual  tendency  but  as  a  set  of  “If  ...then” 
contingencies that spawn behaviour of the “If situation X, then behavior Y” type (Mischel and 
Shoda, 1995, 1999). 
We focus on how to play usual game situations such as PD, CG or trust games and posit 
one possible complementary behavior rule to Nash and its associated equilibrium concept. 
Keeping  the  utilitarian  perspective  and  building  on  the  experimental  observation  that  the 
majority  of  subjects  are  reciprocal  in  public  good  games,  we  focus  on  specific  forms  of 
reciprocity that may well illustrate collective decision-making.
9 Our behavioral hypothesis is 
that choice in many interactive situations requires that each player make the welfare of the 
other a key feature of his or her reasoning. Individuals would choose to play this way because 
this is a common rule -following behavior that improves social welfare in many situations. 
This is mutual support and leads us to posit that in some game situations, individuals care 
about the welfare of others if they believe that others reciprocate. Real life examples are 
numerous and are related to savoir vivre, a set of rules of conduct such as respect for others, 
politeness or courtesy. 
To examine mutual support in social interactions, we exploit an old concept, the Berge 
equilibrium.  We  think this  concept  is  appropriate  for  two  main  reasons.  The  first  is  that 
mutual support is a possible interpretation of Berge equilibrium. Playing under Berge rules, 
agents  choose  the  strategy  that  maximizes  the  welfare  of  others.  The  second  is  that, 
theoretically, the Berge behavior rule and Berge equilibrium are good complements for Nash: 
Berge  equilibrium  is  defined  in  a  non-cooperative  game  theoretical  setting  but  is  not  a 
refinement  of  Nash;  it  explains  some  cooperative  situations  while  Nash  explains  many 
competitive  ones;  and  it  has  some  common  theoretical  properties  with  Nash,  making  it 
particularly appropriate and easy to handle in a type-based perspective.      
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  introduces  non-cooperative  Berge 
equilibrium. We discuss the concept from a historical perspective and propose a definition. 
We interpret the Berge behavior rule and focus on mutual support interpreted as utilitarian 
behavior. Section 3 discusses decision-making and examines the rationales of Nash-Berge 
                                                 
8 A good literature review of the situational approach in social psychology is provided in Reis (2008). 
9  As noted previously, Fischbacher  et  al.  (2001)  observe  in  a  public  good  experiment  that  the  majority  of 
subjects are reciprocal rather than individualistic. Similar observations are documented for example in Kurzban 
and Houser (2005), who found 63% of reciprocal-type agents in their public good experiment.     5 
players.  We  analyze  the  relations  between  Berge  and  Nash  equilibria.  The  existence 
conditions for Berge equilibrium are examined and a systematic and simple method to bridge 
the two equilibrium notions is proposed. Finally, we study the rationales of agents playing as 
Nash or Berge maximizers and examine when players adopt one behavior rule rather than the 
other. The last section offers some conclusions. 
2. Non-cooperative Berge equilibrium 
This  is  Harsanyi  (1966)  that made Nash  equilibrium  and its refinements  the canonical 
concept in game theory. Nash equilibrium became the "test" against which all solutions for 
any game must be measured, and as stressed by Rasmussen (2007, p.27), "Nash equilibrium is 
so  widely  accepted  that  the  reader  can  assume  that  if  a  model  does  not  specify  which 
equilibrium concept is being used it is Nash equilibrium".  Reasons behind this success are 
manifold:  it  constitutes  the  minimal  stability  concept  which  can  be  defined  in  a  non-
cooperative game setting; it is particularly appropriate to study competition situations and 
admits a few competitors that are not refinements. However, one may argue that it is not 
sufficient as such to capture the logic of collective action resulting from non-purely self-
oriented motivations. As a complementary notion we re-introduce and present in this section 
non cooperative Berge equilibrium. 
2.1 The history of a little-known concept 
Between  the  intuition  at  the  origins  of  Berge  equilibrium  and  conceptualization  of  its 
existence  conditions,  there  was  a  gap  of  50  years.  The  initial  intuition  came  from  the 
mathematician Claude Berge when defining coalitional equilibria
10 in the “general theory on 
n-player games” published in 1957.
11  
Berge’s  book  made  only  a  minor  ripple  in  the  academic  pool,  and  is  rarely  cited.
12 
However, it provides an impressive assessment of the state of the art in 1950s’ game theory, 
as well as a diagnosis and interesting development of new results. From a contemporaneous 
perspective, two specificities of the book are particularly striking. First, the “general theory of 
n-player games” remains current, and any up-to-date textbook striving to provide a general 
theory of games would include similar content. Berge’s book, in five chapters, covers the 
                                                 
10 Refer to Laraki (2009) for the properties of the Berge coalitional equilibrium. 
11 The book was published in 1957 when Claude Berge was visiting professor at the Mathematics Department in 
Princeton University. 
12 Among the few citations to his work, most are to the generalization of the Zermelo -Morgenstern’s theorem in 
the first chapter, e.g. Aumann (1960). Note also that most references are in the area of applied mathematics, not 
economics.   6 
major themes that have been the motivation for game theoretic research in the last 50 years: 
games with complete information (ch. 1), topological games (ch. 2), games with incomplete 
information (ch. 3), convex games (ch. 4), and coalitional games (ch. 5). Second, the book is 
an  impressive  contribution  to  the  literature  in  its  provision  of  a  compilation  of  theorems 
related to n-player games. Some were new, others were already known but Berge provided 
alternative demonstrations for them, for example, the theorem on unicity and existence of the 
Shapley value, and the Von-Neumann Morgenstern solution.     
In our view, there are four major reasons for the small impact made by Berge’s book. First, 
it is published in French, which limited its diffusion at the international level. Second, it is not 
aimed at economists: Berge was first and foremost a mathematician and wrote his book from 
this  perspective.  There  are  no  examples  or  applications  of  his  results,  which  probably 
disappointed the 1950s’ social scientists who were not well acquainted with mathematical 
techniques. Third, Berge defines strategies and equilibria using graph theory and again, social 
scientists  were  probably  not  comfortable  with  this  mix  of  mathematical  techniques.  And 
fourth, in 1957 Luce and Raiffa published their seminal work, which is a more pedagogical 
contribution which contains examples and applications. 
Turning  to  recensions  to  Berge’s  work,  we  find  two  unique  reviews.  One  is  by  the 
mathematician, John Peck in 1960, and one by the economist, Martin Shubik in 1961. The 
words of Peck are not eulogistic and criticize the false simplicity of Berge’s work: "In his 
preface, the author states that he has taken care to write for a reader who knows no more 
than the elements of algebra and set theory, and a little topology for chapters 2 and 4. He 
might have added that a mathematical maturity is also required, for this is not an easy book 
for a beginner. With a multiplicity of new notions, some defined on almost every page, and 
some (e.g. cooperative) perhaps not at all, an index of terminology is sorely missed" (p. 348). 
Confirming this, Shubik states that "the argument is presented in a highly abstract manner 
and no consideration is given to applications to economics" (p. 821). 
Berge’s book was translated into Russian in 1961 and first reference to Berge equilibrium 
was in 1985 by Zhukovskii, a Russian mathematician who reformulated the Berge coalitional 
equilibrium  from  an  individualistic  perspective,  naming  it  the  Berge  equilibrium. 
Zhukovskii’s paper does not focus exclusively on Berge equilibrium: it is some 90 pages long 
and discusses the design of a research program on differential games. The author highlights 
10 hot topics, the 10th being Berge equilibrium. According to Zhukovskii, this equilibrium 
notion should be introduced into differential games because it admits the nice properties of 
Nash equilibrium, excluding some of its disadvantages, in particular inexistence. This position   7 
is certainly not sufficient to justify the use of one equilibrium notion over another. But it was 
enough for Russian mathematicians to start working on the topic, and to study the conditions 
for existence, and the properties of Berge equilibrium in differential games.
13   
We need to wait up to 2004 for Abalo and Kostreva (2004, 2005) to propose an existence 
theorem of pure strategy  Berge equilibrium  in normal form games. They elaborate their 
theorem on the basis of the work of  Radjef (1988), a former PhD student of Zukovskii, who 
defined an existence theorem of Berge equilibrium in differential games. Nessah et al. (2007) 
and Larbani and Nessah (2008) then proposed a new existence theorem providing analytical 
validity to Berge equilibrium, and demonstrating that the conditions in Abalo and Kostreva 
(2004, 2005) are not sufficient to prove the existence of a pure-strategy Berge equilibrium. 
2.2 Definition and interpretation 
Consider the game G =  i i i N (N,S ,U )   where N denotes the set of players,  i S  the nonempty 
strategy set of player i, and i U  his utility function.  i U  is defined on S = i i NS
  , where S is 
the  set  of  all  strategy  profiles  and  denote  by  i s   the strategy profile  1 i 1 i 1 (s ,...,s ,s ,...)    
i S = j j iS
  .
14 We start with the definition of Nash equilibrium and proceed to the definition 
of Berge equilibrium. 
 
Definition 1. A feasible strategy profile 
* s S is said to be a Nash equilibrium if, for any 
player iN, and any  i s  i S , we have : 
*
i i i U (s ,s )  
*
i U (s ) 
 
The Nash equilibrium  is immune to unilateral  deviations: player  i has no  incentive to 
deviate from his Nash strategy given that other players also do not deviate from their Nash 
strategy.  
 
Definition 2 (Zhukovskii, 1985). A feasible strategy profile 
* s S is said to be a Berge 
equilibrium if, for any player iN, and any  i s  i S , we have: 
                                                 
13 A synthesis of those works is provided in Zukovskii and Tchikri (1994).  
14  In game theory, utility functions usually reflect overall preferences of agents and therefore encapsulate 
preferences over outcomes such as equity concerns about distribution of rewards. In the current paper, the reader 
may either consider this usual definition, preferences over actions not being accounted in the payoff valuation, or 
consider as in experimental gaming that it reflects simply a reward, a fixed amount of money associated with a 
choice that does not reflects any other-regarding preferences.   8 
*
i i i U (s ,s )  
*
i U (s )                 (1) 
 
Playing  Berge  equilibrium  strategy,  i  yields  his  highest  utility  when  others  also  play 
according to Berge strategy. Unlike Nash equilibrium, Berge equilibrium is not immune to 
unilateral deviations. Player i is penalized if other players deviate from the Berge strategy but 
the equilibrium notion does not say anything about player i might improve his welfare by 
deviating. In this sense, Berge equilibrium is not a standard game solution as defined by non-
cooperative  game  theory  in  that  it  is  not  meant  to  be  immune  to  unilateral  or  collective 
deviations. In contrast to Nash equilibrium where each player maximizes his utility over his 
own strategy set, playing a Berge equilibrium strategy consists of maximizing over the set of 
strategies of the other players. 
We think this equilibrium concept deserves a particular attention because of the reciprocal 
dimension it embeds. To shed light on its meaning we start with an illustration. Consider a 
simple PD. As usual, players may either cooperate (C) or defect (D), resulting in four possible 
outcomes: mutual cooperation (CC), unilateral exploitation (CD or DC), and mutual defection 
or DD. The game is illustrated by the following matrix: 
 
                            Player 2 
C    D 
 
C  R,R              S,T 
         Player 1 
D  T,S           P,P 
 
with R the reward for mutual cooperation; P the punishment for mutual defection; T the 
temptation to cheat the opponent; and S the payoff for one being sucked. For a strict dilemma 
situation, we set T > R > P > S, strategy D is a dominant strategy and outcome (D,D) is the 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game. 
Let us now look at the Berge equilibrium of this game. Observe that outcome (C,C) fulfils 
definition 2: 
1 U (C,C)> 1 U (C,D)  and   2 U (C,C)> 2 U (D,C) 
This is not true for (D,D): 
1 U (D,D)< 1 U (D,C)  and   2 U (D,D)< 2 U (C,D) 
We deduce that mutual cooperation (C,C) is a pure-strategy Berge equilibrium while (D,D) is 
not. The cooperative outcome in the PD is yielded when players follow a Berge behavior rule.   9 
Define now  i   the maximum security level of player i: 
i  = 
i i i i i i i s S s S sup inf U (s ,s )
   
*
i U (s ) iN,  i s  i S .       (2) 
If inequality 2 is true for any player iN, the Berge equilibrium yields a payoff that must 
be no less than the maxmin. 
Considering the PD, we have: 
1  = 
22 1 2 1 2 ss max{min U (C,s ),min U (D,s )}= max {S,P} = P < R and  2  = P < R,  
and we conclude that the strategy profile (C,C) is individually rational. Considering now a 
simple CG and using similar notations, the payoffs order is T > R > S > P. Beside the two 
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, (C,C) is the only pure strategy Berge equilibrium and this 
outcome is individually rational.  
In order to understand how paradoxes are disentangled, we scrutinize the logic underlying 
this equilibrium concept and the meanings of the associated behavior rule. The main question 
that arises is why would other players consent to playing Berge strategy when player i does 
so?  Individual  utility  maximization  predicts  unilateral  deviation  and  playing  in  a  Berge 
fashion can be interpreted in two ways: 
The first interpretation is related to altruism and finds analogies with solidarity as defined 
first by Ibn Khadun (1378), by Durkheim (1893) and many others.
15 Members of a same 
family, for example husband and wife, may put the utility of the other before his or her own
16. 
Even in a winner-looser zero-sum game, this altruistic type of individual attempt to lose in 
order for the other to feel good. Maximization of the  utility  of the other translates in 
minimization of individual  utility. In other game situat ions, such as PD or CG, altruistic 
individuals  naturally  cooperate.  They  do  not  compete  and  cooperation  is  the  dominant 
strategy to maximize the  utility of the other. Both players end up in a better situation. The 
principal limit of this perspective is its narrow domain of application. Pure altruism can exist 
only in a specific environment, such as the family circle, where the other is more valuable 
than oneself.  
The second interpretation, mutual support, is related more to a form of reciprocity and find 
analogies with introspection. Consider a player j who can either play his Berge strategy or not, 
given that the N-1 other players play their Berge strategy.  According to definition 2, we 
have:     
* * *
i i i j j U (s ,s ,s )    
* *
i i i j j U (s ,s ,s )   iN,  j s j S   
                                                 
15 Ibn Khaldun conception of solidarity ("asabiyah") is dynastic and occurs within small groups such as tribes. 
For Durkheim, solidarity is a sense of likeness that would favor a common consciousness maintained by social 
pressure and conformity.  
16 A treatment of solidarity related to our approach is performed in Arnsperger and Varoufakis (2003).   10 
 
When playing his Berge strategy, player j maximizes the payoff of i. This is true for any iN 
and, in fact, player j maximizes the utility of all other players. Reciprocally, in playing Berge 
strategies, the other players maximize the utility of j and of all their partners if they also play 
Berge strategies.  In several  game situations,  everyone improves  his  utility:  this  is  mutual 
support and is unrelated to solidarity or dynasties. Mutual support can be observed between 
strangers, and individuals play this way because it is a set of rules of conduct that serve 
common interest. For Sen (1987), when players face situations such as the PD, they may 
adopt reciprocal behavior because they understand that success in such situations is the result 
of  mutual  interdependance.  Even  if  players  do  not  encapsulate  others  players’  goals, 
acknowledging interdependance may lead to adopt behavior rules that realise the goals of the 
members of the group. According to this logic, the Berge equilibrium should not be seen as a 
solution concept opposed to the Nash equilibrium, but rather as a complementary concept 
insofar as it applies to situations where agents think that the others can adopt the same type of 
reasoning as themselves. 
To the question how can mutual support be sustainable against deviations over time, the 
natural response is then to borrow from the work of cognitive psychologists.  According to 
Anderson  (1991,  p.  428),  “The  mind  has  the  structure  it  has  because  the  world  has  the 
structure  it  has”.  In  other  words,  the  mind  has  evolved  certain  structures  because  those 
structures permitted our early ancestors to solve critical problems effectively and efficiently. 
More specifically, the rules of conducts underlying mutual support are related to Kropotkin's 
mutual aid principle, which is the predisposition to help one another.
17 In “Mutual Aid: A 
factor of evolution”
18 published in 1902, Kropotkin gives a scientific foundation to mutual aid 
elaborating the work of Darwin (1859) and responding to social Darwinist, Thomas Huxley 
(1888). Kropotkin claims that codification and interpretation of social relationships under the 
prism of Darwin’s “struggle for life” theory is a misunderstanding. His view is that mutual aid 
plays a significant role in the evolution of society, far more than is posited in the “social 
struggle for life” theory.
19 Considering historic events, Kropotkin observes that when faced by 
                                                 
17 Note that Kropotkin in the “Anarchist Moral” published in 1891 employs the terms solidarity and mutual aid 
indiscriminately. He then abandons the term solidarity which he judges to be too focused to include mutual aid 
motivated only by the mutual interest in helping one another. 
18 Although mutual aid did not attract much attention from the biology and economics scientif ic literatures, 
authors such as Fong et al. (2006) and Foster and Xavier (2007) recommend further study of Kropotkin’s work 
to better understand the foundations of cooperation.  
19 Dugger (1984, p. 973) notes that the book "was written especially to show that a full theory of evolution must 
include  the  workings  of  cooperation  for  survival  as  well  as  the  standard  competition  for  survival".  This 
statement was defended notably by Gould (1988).   11 
the scarcity of a resource, overpopulation does not lead necessarily to conflict but may lead to 
migration. In his view, life organized in society is the most adequate response to the struggle 
for life in an inhospitable world. Hence, he contrasts struggling for life against one another 
within a group with struggling for life by the group against the world. Life in a society is 
viewed as mutual protection enabling conservation and prosperity of the species.
20 Although 
accepting the importance of the individual in the  community, Kropotkin claims that progress 
cannot be the result of individualistic competition.  Instead it is the result of the capacity 
mutually to aid each other when problems involve collective action.
21 In this perspective, 
mutual support and egoism coexist, with individuals playing one behavior rule or the other 
according  to  the  problem  with  which  they  are  confronted.  Singer  (1993)  supports  this 
utilitarian perspective arguing that consideration of others' interests has for long been a 
necessary part of the human experience. By playing mutual  support in some situations, total 
utility is maximized; individual utility maximization is a corollary.
22 Self-interest obviously 
can conflict with utilitarianism and lead to collective action paradoxes. However, as suggested 
by Singer (1993, p. 143), in a reference to the Golden rule: “Given others have senses, and 
like us, feel suffering and pain […] our reason should tell us that if we would not like to be 
made to suffer, neither will they”. In other words, this is reminiscent of Axelrod’s tit-for-tat 
strategy and in analogy to Binmore (2007)’s illustration of anonymous vampire bats strategy 
to survive, mutual support would be one of the social behavior used in the repeated game of 
life to ensure success in some situations, punishment being obviously not explicit here.   
Back to Berge equilibrium, as mutual support translates into playing Berge strategy and 
egoistic competition into playing Nash  strategy, we next  examine how the game may be 
played, and in what particular situations.  
3. Nash versus Berge behavior rule 
3.1 Theoretically, two related equilibrium concepts 
                                                 
20Focusing  on  Siberian  tribes,  on  Polynesian  islanders,  on  medieval  corporations  and  on  the  nascent 
industrialized society; he illustrates mutual aid in the development of human society. He argues in particular that 
since Stone Age man, mutual aid has played a key role in survival and progress, leading humans to live first in 
clans,  next  in  tribes.  Through  hunting,  collective  defense  and  common  territorial  property,  human  beings 
developed social institutions that were the foundations for progress. Society enlarged successively, with villages, 
cities, countries, ruled by stringent social institutions enabling collective action, and limiting individualism. 
21 Refer also to the analysis of Kropotkin’s work in Glassman (2000) and Caparros et al. (2010). 
22 A large literature is devoted to the validity of this corollary with notably  criticisms of utilitarianism based on 
ethical considerations around equity, average versus total utility paradoxes, and the repugnant conclusion (Parfit, 
1984; Rachels, 2001).   12 
In studying Nash and Berge equilibria in well known two player games, we observe that 
the relationship between the two equilibrium concepts is not straightforward. In some games, 
there is no Nash  equilibrium but a unique Berge equilibrium (e.g. the taxation game), in 
others this is the reverse. There are games with a multiplicity of  Nash equilibrium but a 
unique Berge equilibrium (e.g. the CG) and others with multiple Berge equilibrium but a 
single Nash equilibrium. There are games where Nash and Berge equilibria coincide, the case, 
for instance, with the battle of the sexes, and games where they do not (e.g. PD).  
Larbani  and  Nessah  (2008)  study  conditions  for  the  two  equilibria  to  coincide. 
Complementary, and in order to better understand how the two concepts are bridged, we study 
the  existence  condition  of  Berge  equilibrium  and  propose  a  simple  rule  illustrating  the 
relationship between the two. 
We note first that the existence conditions for Nash equilibrium and Berge equilibrium are 
related. Focusing on two player games
23, N=  1,2 , and denoting by  i S the set of strategies of 
player i, we have: 
 
Proposition 1. A 22   game has  at least one Berge equilibrium if: 
- The strategy sets  1 S  and  2 S  are nonempty, convex and compact, 
- the utility functions  1 U  and  2 U  are continuous on S, 
- the function  1 U  is quasiconcave on  2 S , 1 s  1 S , and the function  2 U  is quasiconcave on 
1 S ,  2 s  2 S . 
 
Proof.  Let C:  SS   be a multivalued mapping such that C( 12 , ss)=   1 1 2 C s ,s x   2 1 2 C s ,s  
where:     1 1 2 C s ,S =  
11
**
1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 sS s S / U (s ,s ) Max U (s ,s )
   1 S  
  2 1 2 C s ,S = 
22
**
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 sS s S / U (s ,s ) Max U (s ,S )
   2 S . 
By compactness of  i S  and continuity of  i U , i = 1, 2,  we can easily show that C has 
nonempty,  compact  values  and  a  closed  graph.  Furthermore,  it  also  has  convex  values 
whenever the  i U , i = 1, 2, is quasiconcave. Then, by Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem, 
the multivalued mapping C has a fixed point and so the game has a pure Berge equilibrium #  
 
                                                 
23  In  the  case  of  n-player  games,  additional  conditions  are  necessary  to  ensure  the  existence  of  Berge 
equilibrium. For more details, see Nessah et al. (2007).   13 
The first two conditions are common to the Nash equilibrium existence conditions. The 
only  difference  between  the  two  equilibria  is  that  the  function  i 1 2 U (s ,s )  must  be  quasi-
concave in  i s  for all given  j s  in the Nash equilibrium, and quasi-concave in  j s  for all given 
i s  in the Berge equilibrium. Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem is sufficient to ensure the 
existence condition of Nash equilibrium when the objective functions are continuous in their 
domains and quasiconcave in their own strategy. It is respectively sufficient to ensure the 
existence condition of Berge equilibrium when the objective functions are continuous in their 
own domains but quasi-concave in the strategy of the other. It results that both equilibrium is 
a fixed point; Nash equilibrium being immune to deviation from individual action, Berge 
equilibrium being immune to deviation in the action of the other. 
We deduce an explicit relation between the two equilibria. Let associate the game  G  = 
1 2 1 2 (N {1,2},S ,S ,V ,V )   to the game G = 1 2 1 2 (N {1,2},S ,S ,U ,U )  , with  1 V = 2 U  and  2 V = 1 U . 
The proposition follows:  
 
Proposition 2.  * sS  is a Nash equilibrium of the game G if and only if s* is a Berge 
equilibrium of the game G . 
 
Proof. Consider the game G and let s*=
* *
1 2 (s ,s ) be a Nash equilibrium of G. By definition, we 
have:     1 s  1 S  
*
1 1 2 U (s ,s ) 
* *
1 1 2 U (s ,s )  
 2 s  2 S  
*
2 1 2 U (s ,s ) 
* *
2 1 2 U (s ,s ). 
Given  1 V = 2 U  and  2 V =  1 U ,  
 1 s  1 S  
*
2 1 2 V (s ,s ) 
* *
2 1 2 V (s ,s )  
 2 s  2 S  
*
1 1 2 V (s ,s ) 
* *
1 1 2 V (s ,s ). 
Thus s* is a Berge equilibrium, the reciprocal being proved in a similar way . #  
 
In other words, the set of Berge equilibrium in the 2x2 game coincides with the set of Nash 
equilibria of the homothetic game consisting of permutating the utility of the two players. To 
identify the Berge equilibrium of a game, it suffices to permute the utility of players - as if 
they were assuming their partner’s joys and sorrows – and to identify the Nash equilibrium 
resulting from this new situation.  
We illustrate this result in a simple taxation game (where there is no Nash equilibrium). 
Let player 1 be the state and player 2 be a firm. The state can either tax (denoted T) or not   14 
(denoted NT) while the firm can either invest (denoted I) or not (denoted NI). The matrix of 
the game is the following: 
         Player 2 
NI    I 
 
T    0,1               3,0 
         Player 1 
NT    1,2           2,3 
 
We have 1 U (NT,I)> 1 U (NT,NI)  and   2 U (NT,I)> 2 U (T,I), and there is a unique Berge 
equilibrium given by (NT,I). Permutating utilities, we obtain the following modified game: 
 
          Player 2 
NI    I 
 
T    1,0               0,3 
         Player 1 
NT    2,1           3,2 
             
which admits a unique Nash equilibrium given by (NT,I). Proposition 2 tells that this is also 
the unique Berge equilibrium of the initial game, and this corresponds exactly to the previous 
result. 
It  follows  that  technically,  analyzing  the  choices  of  agents  that  mutually  support  each 
other, coincides with analyzing the choices of agents acting egoistically in a modified game 
where utilities are permutated. We deduce that Berge equilibrium admits similar properties to 
Nash equilibrium in the sense that according to the payoff structure, it may exist or not, be 
unique  or  multiple.  Three  corollaries  apply:  (1)  if  in  the  modified  game  the  set  of  Nash 
equilibrium is empty, there is no Berge equilibrium in the initial game; (2) if there are several 
Nash equilibrium in the modified game, there are also several Berge equilibrium in the initial 
game; (3) if the modified game coincides with the initial game, Nash and Berge equilibria 
also coincide.  
3.2 Situational perspective and utilitarism 
As soon as we assume that according to the situation, individual decision making may be 
ruled by distinct behavior rules, a crucial question is to ask when one behavior rule is likely to 
be employed rather than the other. This question is not new and fed the trait-situation debate   15 
in  social  psychology  over  the  last  decades.
24  In particular, many critcized the situational 
approach for lacking conceptualization and for failing to address an operational theory of the 
mind. For example,  Kenny  et  al. (2001, p. 129) reproached that  “there is  no universally 
accepted scheme for understanding what is meant by situation. It does not even appear that 
there are major competing schemes, and all too often the situation is undefined”. Reis (2008) 
admits  the  concept  of  situation  is  ill-defined  but  presents  a  taxonomy  to  characterize 
situations. Reviewing the various attempts that were accomplish to formulate a situation based 
theory of personality, he derives from Interdependance Theory a taxonomy in terms of six 
dimensions of outcome interdependence: (1) the extent to which an individual’s outcomes 
depend on the actions of others; (2) whether individuals have mutual or asymmetric power 
over each other’s outcomes; (3) whether one individual’s outcomes correspond or conflict 
with the other’s; (4) whether partners must coordinate their activities to produce satisfactory 
outcomes, or whether each one’s actions are sufficient to determine the other’s outcomes; (5) 
the situation’s temporal structure: whether the situation involves interaction over the long 
term; and (6) information certainty: whether partners have the information needed to make 
good decisions, or whether uncertainty exists about the future. 
Contrasting with most situational approaches in social psychology, the context we examine 
is relatively simple given we consider only two behavior rules and focus on simple 22 game 
situations. Using previous taxonomy, one may conjecture that Berge equilibrium is all the 
more  pertinent  when  individuals  have  mutual  power  over  eac h  other  outcomes,  when 
outcomes  do  not  correspond,  when  partners  tend  to  need  to  coordinate  to  produce  the 
outcome, when the situation is repeated and when as much information is available. Although 
that would be interesting to test those hypotheses experimentally, we follow an alternative 
avenue to explain which rule may be preferred when. We consider that individuals play in a 
Berge fashion when they expect that the other does the same and when they know that this 
rule of conduct is able to make their life go best for them. 
In other words, we posit that whatever the behavior rule they choose, agents are motivated 
by  utilitarianism  motivations.  They  play  either  following  a  self-oriented  or  in  a  mutual 
supportive rule of conduct but always are motivated by success. This leads to define classes of 
games where mutual support is the most successful strategy and where it is not. 
The Berge behavior rule and equilibrium gives peculiar results when studying zero sum 
game type situations. To see this, consider a two player zero sum game where  1 U is the utility 
                                                 
24 For an overview of the long standing debate about personality and situation, refer to Van Mechelen and De 
Raad (1999).   16 
function of player 1, and  2 U  is the loss function of player 2,  2 U = - 1 U . We know that s* S   
is a Berge equilibrium if: 
       2 s  2 S , 
*
1 1 2 U (s ,s ) 
* *
1 1 2 U (s ,s ), 
  1 s  1 S ,  
*
2 1 2 U (s ,s ) 
* *
2 1 2 U (s ,s ). 
 
As 2 U = - 1 U , player 1 obtains the maximum payoff if 2 agrees to play a Berge strategy 
*
2 s  
which consists of maximizing his loss (i.e., 
2
*
1 1 2 s max U (s ,s ) =
2
*
2 1 2 s max [ U (s ,s )]  ). Similarly, 
player 2 obtains the lowest loss if 1 agrees to play a Berge strategy 
*
1 s  so as to minimize his 
utility  (i.e., 
1
*
2 1 2 s min U (s ,s )=
1
*
1 1 2 s max [ U (s ,s )]  ).  This  is  sacrificial  behavior  and  it  is  not 
compatible  with  a  utilitarian  treatment.  More  generally,  competition  situations,  such  as 
competitive games, Bertrand or Cournot duopolies, do not fit with mutual support because it 
involves mutually exclusive goal attainment. In those cases one may assume that individuals 
play mostly in a Nash fashion. Conversely, Berge rule is often appropriate in cooperative type 
of situation where agents must coordinate their activities to produce satisfactory outcomes. 
But in all cases and as suggested by experimental evidence, there is no straight rule of thumb 
and as part of the situation approach, the environment within which players are interacting in 
affects significantly the behavior rule they follow.  In particular, perceptions of the other’s 
intent are a critical determinant of choices in most bargaining and social dilemma games 
(Messick & Brewer, 1983). Individuals in close relationships respond differently to conflicts 
of  interest  depending  on  whether  they  perceive  their  partners  to  be  open  minded  and 
responsive or self serving and hostile (Murray et al., 2006). Finally, individuals are much 
more likely to approach strangers who they expect will like them rather than not like them 
(Berscheid and Walster,1978). A key component when choosing how to act is related to the 
expectation of how partners will react. 
 
3.3. Situations and dispositions: an operational approach  
 
Gauthier (1986) is certainly the first to analyse games in a situational perspective. His 
approach is all the more relevant for us that applying it makes unecessary the association 
between  behavior  rules  and  situations.  Using  Gauthier’s  disposition  approach  tells  us  in   17 
utilitarist  terms  whether  a  given  game  is  played  using  Nash  or  Berge  rule.
25  Gauthier 
considers  that  individuals  choose  their  disposition  prior  to  interaction .  Dispositions  are 
defined as behaviour rules and may change according to the situations. Focusing on the PD, 
Gauthier assumes individuals may be in two dispositions: (i) “straightforward maximization” 
a behaviour rule according to they seek to maximize their utility given the strategies of those 
with whom they interact; and (ii) “constrained maximization” a behaviour rule according to 
they “seek in some situations to maximize their utility, given not the strategies but the utilities 
of those with whom they interact” (p. 167). Given those dispositions, Gauthier’s result is that 
players should choose constrained maximization in the PD. 
Complementing  this  work,  Brennan  and  Hamlin  (2000)  further  consider  what  may  be 
available dispositions. They propose to substitute the hypothesis of egoism by the hypothesis 
of competing motivations, self-interest being one of them. They argue that: « the disposition 
of  rational  egoism  is  not  the  disposition  that  will  make  your  life  go  best  for  you.  Your 
expected lifetime pay-off may be larger if you were to have different disposition. (The analysis 
of  rational  trustworthiness  is  a  relevant  example  here).  If  this  is  true,  the  disposition  of 
rational egoism (the strict homo economicus disposition) is self-defeating in Parfit’s sense; 
and it would be in your own interest to choose a different disposition if only that is possible” 
(Brennan  and  Hamlin  2008,  p.  80).  This  is  the  perspective  we  consider  in  order  to  give 
support  to  Berge  equilibrium  and  we  apply  Gauthier  considering  individuals  have  two 
available  dispositions:  adopt  a  Berge  or  a  Nash  behavior-rule.  In  order  to  show  how  we 
proceed we examine several examples. 
Let us first consider a well known cooperation game situation, the trust game: 
            Player 2 
 
Honor   Exploit 
 
Trust    X,X              Y,Z 
         Player 1 
Distrust  0,0           0,0 
 
                                           
Y < 0 < X < Z. Observe that for player 2, Exploit is a weakly dominant strategy. The Nash 
equilibrium (Distrust, Exploit) is unique, the Berge equilibrium (Trust, Honor) as well.  
Assume that players are paired randomly. They have the choice between two dispositions: 
the Nash behavior rule (NR) and the Berge behavior rule (BR). We call the NR player the first 
                                                 
25 Note that the word disposition is usually employed in the psychology literature as synonymous to trait. A 
predisposition to have a given identity as something fixed. Instead in Gauthier, dispositions are inclinations that 
may change according to the situation faced, they are dynamic and may change.   18 
type and the BR player the second type. Players follow BR when they expect their partner 
does the same and the choice to be of one type rather than the other depends on the relative 
expected utilities. Probability to play as a type 1 or as a type 2 is even. We denote by   the 
share of BR players in the population. Supposing first that before the game starts, players 
know their own type as well as the type of their partner, the expected utilities of NR and BR 
players is respectively EU(NR) = 0 and EU(BR) =  X  . For any > 0, the expected utility of 
BR players is strictly higher than the expected utility of NR players; if    = 0, the expected 
utilities of the two types of players are even. To be a BR player improves welfare as soon as 
there are other BR players in the population with whom to establish trust relations. Otherwise, 
if he is unique, BR player plays as if he were a NR player.  
Relaxing  the  assumption  that  individuals  identify  the  type  of  their  partner,  the  result 
remains robust. To see this, assume that both BR and NR players fail to identify those they 
interact  with.  Let    be  the  probability  that  BR  players  identify  each  other  and    the 
probability that they fail to identify NR players. The expected utilities of BR and NR players 
are respectively: 



















) 1 (  
.      (3) 
 
If condition (3) is fulfilled, players adopt BR even though they may interact unknowingly 




also increases, lowering the risk of mistaking NR players for BR players. Second, when the 
relative gain from cooperation increases, condition (3) becomes less constraining making BR 
more  attractive.  We  deduce  that  individuals  will  be  more  likely  to  adopt  BR  when  the 
magnitude of the social dilemma is important and when their social environment is not too 




 is to be at least equal to 5/4. That is when the probability of achieving mutual 
recognition is to be at least 1.25 times higher than the probability to fail recognizing a NR 
player. 
Considering other game situations may lead us to the opposite result that NR should be 
preferred. This is the case for zero-sum games, in most competitive situations and even in   19 




C    D 
 
C    3,3               4,1 
         Player 1 
D    1,4           2,2 
 
                                           
There is a unique Nash equilibrium at (C,C) and a unique Berge equilibrium at (D,D). 
Letting individuals choose their disposition before the game starts, we deduce that best for 
players is to play in a Nash fashion. To see it, let first individuals know the type of their 
partner. We have: EU(NR) = 3 and EU(BR) = 3 -  and for any  > 0, it pays to choose a NR 
disposition. Now let assume that individuals do not know the type of their partner. We have 







. This is always true and individuals always choose to play in a NR 
fashion. 
Generally  and  taking  for  granted  the  revisionist  rational  view  according  to  individuals 
follow  the  rules  of  conduct  that  makes  your  life  go  best  for  you,  this  diposition-based 
approach may tell us for any game situation when Berge equilibrium is to be applied to a 
game situation and when Nash equilibrium is to be applied. The answer in each case will rely 
on the utility structure of the game and on player subjective probabilistic appreciation of the 
type of partner they are interacting with. 
4 Conclusion 
This paper provides a step toward the treatment of moral preferences focusing on behavior 
rules. In contrast to the consequentialist approach which adds other-regarding expressions into 
the utility function of players, we question the canonical view that the Nash rule is appropriate 
to examine any game situation. We depict decision making within a situational perspective 
which assumes that individuals’ behavior rules vary according to the situations faced. We 
focus  on  2 2    game  situations  and  argue  that  in  cooperative  situations,  social  norms, 
including  reciprocity  and  kindness,  suggest  that  individuals  often  play  in  a  mutually 
supporting fashion.   20 
Mutual support does not capture the many idiosyncratic moral preferences observed in the 
experimental  literature  and  we  do  not  aim  here  to  provide  an  exhaustive  treatment  of 
situational  decision-making.  Rather,  our  objective  as  a  first  step  to  design  a  situational 
decision-making theory was to focus on a simple behavior rule that may complement Nash. 
The  behavior  rule  is  mutual  support  to  model  it,  we  revive  non-cooperative  Berge 
equilibrium.  Studying  the  conditions  of  its  existence,  we  show  that  Nash  and  Berge 
equilibrium are strongly related and we define a simple method to link one with the other.  
Because playing in a Berge fashion is not immune to deviation, we examine the rationale 
for playing in a Berge fashion. Assuming individuals play according to one behavior rule or 
the other, depending on the situation, we show à la Gauthier that a player may be well-off 
playing a Berge behavior rule in some game situations even when no repetition or punishment 
mechanisms are made available. Per se, the disposition approach is an operational approach 
that tells us which behavior rule is played when. 
In terms of further, related research there are three lines that we see as being particularly 
appealing.  The  first  is  an  experimental  paper  which  complements  this  conjectural  paper, 
whose assumptions call for experiments. Along the lines of Henrich et al. (2004, 2010), we 
are interested in a better understanding of when individuals tend towards one behavior rule or 
another. Again, we can make multiple assumptions and exploit the situational taxonomy of 
Reis  (2008),  in  particular.  The  second  enquiry  is  theoretical  and  relates  to  one  of  our 
companion papers on the properties of n-players Berge equilibrium. We saw in the examples 
considered in the paper that for PD, CG, taxation and trust games,  Berge equilibrium are 
Pareto-optimal. However, this is not always the case and an interesting line of research is to 
define classes of games for which Berge equilibrium is Pareto-optimal and always Pareto-
dominated.  Finally,  to  conclude,  we  have  attempted  to  show  that  the Berge  rule  may  be 
appropriate to apprehend human behaviors in some situations, and the Nash rule in others. 
This is inevitably a simplification and we think that many other rules complete these two. 
Better scrutinization of other behavior rules and their axiomatic and theoretical properties are 
the next step in defining a situational theory of decision making.  
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